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HUNGER STRIKING PRISONERS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FORCE-FEEDING
INTRODUCTION
When a prisoner goes on a hunger strike,' the government must
decide whether to force-feed him or allow him to die. Force-feeding,
however, may violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. Although a
prisoner's rights are limited2 by governmental interests that pertain to
all members of society, 3 and by interests that are peculiar to the penal
system, 4 a prisoner does not lose all of his constitutional rights by
reason of confinement. 5
All but one of the few courts addressing this issue have permitted
the government to force-feed the prisoner.6 Moreover, a federal code
regulation permitting force-feeding of federal prisoners7 has been
upheld as constitutional. 8 This Note, while recognizing that force-
feeding may under certain circumstances be constitutional, criticizes
the reasoning of the decisions that have permitted force-feeding.
1. 28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (1982) provides a statutory basis for classifying a prisoner
as a hunger striker:
(a) When he or she communicates that fact to staff and is observed by staff
to be refraining from eating for a period of time, ordinarily in excess of
72 hours; or
(b) When staff observe the inmate to be refraining from eating for a period
in excess of 72 hours. When staff consider it prudent to do so, a referral
for medical evaluation may be made without waiting 72 hours.
2. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
3. P. Clute, The Legal Aspects of Prisons and Jails 5-6 (1980); see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973) (no rights are absolute).
4. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 129-30 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974).
5. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."); accord Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098,
1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (force-feeding not
permitted); In re Clauso, No. L33141-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 22, 1982)
(order permitting force-feeding); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450
N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982) (same); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va.
1982) (same).
7. Hunger Strikes, Inmate, 28 C.F.R. §§ 549.60-.66 (1982). These sections
provide guidelines promulgated by the Bureau of Prisons regarding the medical care
and administrative procedures relating to inmates who hunger strike. The Bureau of
Prisons is responsible for the health and welfare of federal inmates. Id. § 549.60.
8. Boyce v. Petrovsky, No. 81-3322 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981).
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Part I of this Note argues that a hunger striker's right to bodily
integrity is fundamental, and can be overcome only by a compelling
governmental interest. Part II addresses the relevant countervailing
governmental interests. After concluding that no general societal in-
terests are sufficient to overcome a mentally competent hunger
striker's right of privacy, the analysis shifts to the particular interests
of the penal system. Part II then proposes a standard for establishing a
threat to such interests sufficient to override a prisoner's constitutional
rights.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF A HUNGER STRIKER
Hunger striking prisoners threatened with force-feeding have as-
serted that such governmental interference violates their first amend-
ment right of freedom of expression.9 The Supreme Court has stated,
however, that in determining whether an abridgement of a prisoner's
first amendment rights is constitutional, a court should consider
whether a prisoner could exercise this right by "alternative means." 10
Because hunger strikers can express their views through alternative
means," the first amendment will not protect them from being force-
fed.' 2 For example, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Un-
9. Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (1982)
("[The prisoner] claims that he was attempting to draw public attention to the
starving children of the world."); Brief for Appellee at 5-6, Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga.
832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (inmate attempting to communicate that he wanted to be
transferred to another prison).
10. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-24 (1974); accord Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 551-52 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S.
119, 130 n.6 (1977).
Although restrictions on first amendment rights may not be broader than neces-
sary to further a governmental interest, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968), the Supreme Court has stated that "[p]rison administrators ... should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
11. A hunger striker could, for example, write a letter to the editor of a newspa-
per. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824 (1974) (Court upheld regulation
prohibiting face-to-face interviews between inmates and reporters).
12. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551-52 (1979) (inmate's first amendment
right to receive certain hard-cover books outweighed by threat to prison security);
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129-33 (1977) (in-
mate's first amendment right to associate and form union outweighed by threat to
prison security); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-24 (1974) (inmate's first amend-
ment right to face-to-face communications with journalists outweighed by threat to
prison security). In Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1982), the court summarily dismissed the hunger striker's claim. See id. at 70-71,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 627. After ruling that the right of privacy does not include the right
to commit suicide, id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625; see infra notes 32-34 and accompa-
nying text, the court stated that "[w]hereas a prisoner's right of expression may not be
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ion,13 inmates were prevented from organizing a union through which
they could express their complaints. 14 In upholding the prohibition, 5
the Court stated that the prison's ban "merely affected one of several
ways in which inmates may voice their complaints."'" Although a
prisoner may prefer hunger striking to alternative means, the Court
has stated that the removal of more " 'desirable' [means] does not
convert the prohibitory regulations into unconstitutional acts."'17
Prisoners have also asserted that force-feeding violates their right of
privacy. 8 The alternative means inquiry is not relevant to this asser-
tion because the prisoner is seeking to prevent a governmental intru-
sion, not to protect a particular means of exercising a right.Y' The
right of privacy may thus provide more protection for the hunger
striker. Because the right of privacy is a fundamental right,2 0 it may
not be abrogated unless the government shows a compelling interest. 2'
circumscribed to an extent greater than that required for the legitimate ends of prison
security and administration ... those legitimate interests clearly include the need to
prevent a prisoner's suicide even if cloaked in the guise of First Amendment expres-
sion." 87 A.D.2d at 70-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (citations omitted).
13. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
14. Id. at 122, 132-33.
15. Id. at 132-33.
16. Id. at 130 n.6.
17. Id. The regulation, however, must operate in a "neutral fashion, without
regard to the content of the expression." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974).
18. Boyce v. Petrovksy, No. 81-3322 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981); Zant v. Pre-
vatte, 248 Ga. 832, 833, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1982); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87
A.D.2d 66, 67-68, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (1982); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292
S.E.2d 54, 56 (W. Va. 1982). The Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is true that
inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined, but they do not lose all
civil rights .... Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain certain funda-
mental rights of privacy." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978); accord
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979).
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 15-1 to -3 (1978). Although
the right of privacy is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it has been
afforded constitutional protection. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The
source of this right has been variously defined. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99
n.23 (1977) (fourteenth amendment's "concept of personal liberty"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (penumbras of certain guarantees in the Bill of
Rights); id. at 486-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (language and history of the ninth
amendment); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (common law).
The right of privacy, regardless of its source, "is now an established part of our
constitutional jurisprudence." Dike v. School Bd., 650 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1981).
This right has two aspects: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
21. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitu-
tional Law 382-84 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. Nowak]. This Note refers to the
maintenance of prison discipline and security as a compelling interest, in light of the
Supreme Court's statement that "[o]ne of the primary functions of government is the
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If force-feeding violates a prisoner's right of privacy, it should not be
justified by a mere rational relationship to a legitimate interest.22
The right of privacy-the right to be let alone 3-encompasses only
those rights "deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' ",24 Force-feeding, which is generally accomplished
by forcing greased tubes down the throat into the stomach,2 5 unques-
tionably violates bodily integrity.26 The Supreme Court has declared
the right to bodily integrity as basic to our society.27 For example, in
preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the
maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task." Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
22. If the government asserts an interest that is not peculiar to the prison environ-
ment, it is held to a high standard of proof. J. Nowak, supra note 21, at 382-84; L.
Tribe, supra note 20, § 15-9, at 915; see San Antonio School Indep. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). If a penal interest is asserted, however, the standard is lower. See
infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
23. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[The Founding Fathers] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."), overruled on other grounds, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53
(1967).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
794-95 (1969)). Not every aspect of an individual's private life, therefore, is protected
by this right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (state does not violate right
of privacy by public disclosure of arrest record); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v.
Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 524-27, 315 N.E.2d 9, 15-17 (state employees may be
required to file disclosure statements), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Schulman
v. New York City Dep't of Health and Hosps. Corp., 44 A.D.2d 482, 483-84, 355
N.Y.S.2d 781, 782-83 (1974) (right of privacy does not prevent naming mother on
death certificate of aborted fetus), aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975).
25. Webster's New World Dictionary 545 (2d College ed. 1978). One magazine
article reported that two Arab prisoners choked to death when they were force-fed by
Israeli officials. The prisoners were sedated and had "tubes thrust down their throats
and into their stomachs." Newsweek, Aug. 4, 1980, at 32, col. 1. In Von Holden v.
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982), the prison official applied to
Special Term seeking an order to force-feed Chapman either intravenously or by a
nasal gastric tube. Id. at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
26. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court, in determining
whether the suspect's right to due process was violated, ruled that the pumping of his
stomach to obtain physical evidence was "conduct that shocks the conscience....
[T]he struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction
of his stomach's contents . . .is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities." Id. at
172. Although force-feeding and stomach pumping are performed for different pur-
poses, both impose a significant intrusion on bodily integrity.
27. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977); Union Pac. Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-
Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26
Rutgers L. Rev. 228, 241 (1973) ("The point remains, however, that no more basic
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Schmerber v. California, 2  while permitting the government to
subject a suspected drunk driver to a blood test,2 9 the Court stated:
"The interests in human dignity [are] . .. fundamental human inter-
ests.... The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of
our society."' 30 Therefore, the right to bodily integrity is encompassed
by the right of privacy.3'
In Von Holden v. Chapman,32 however, a New York appellate
court permitted the force-feeding of a prisoner, 33 stating that: "[I]t is
self-evident that the right to privacy does not include the right to
commit suicide. ' 34 Yet, the right to prevent force-feeding can exist
independently of any right to commit suicide.35 Instead of determin-
ing whether a prisoner has the right to commit suicide, the court
aspect of personal privacy can be found than bodily integrity, and this interest is
entitled to concomitant constitutional protection.").
28. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
29. Id. at 771-72. The Court permitted the blood test because it considered the
intrusion insubstantial. Id.
30. Id. at 769-70, 772.
31. Cantor, supra note 27, at 241. The fundamentality of the right of privacy is
implicit in the fourth and fifth amendments. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 778-79 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment marks a 'zone
of privacy' which the Government may not force a person to surrender . . . . Like-
wise the Fourth Amendment recognizes [the right of privacy] when it guarantees the
right of the people to be secure 'in their persons.' " (citation omitted)).
32. 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
33. Id. at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
34. Id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S. 2d at 625. The court reasoned that because the Supreme
Court has held the right of privacy to include "only personal rights . . . deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' "a person's self-destruc-
tive acts could not be protected under this right. Id. (citations omitted). See supra
note 24 and accompanying text. The analysis of the Chapman court is faulty. In Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that the right of a woman to have an
abortion is included in the right of privacy, id. at 154, and only at the point of
viability of the fetus is the state's compelling interest in protecting life overriding. Id.
at 163. Similarly, the Chapman court should have determined first whether the right
of privacy includes the right to bodily integrity, and second, whether the state's
interest in preventing suicide is sufficient to override the right to bodily integrity. The
existence of countervailing interests should not bear upon whether the right exists,
but rather whether the right may be overcome. Thus, the Chapman court should not
have summarily dismissed the inmate's asserted right as non-fundamental.
35. In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court reviewed
a state law that restricted the distribution of, and therefore access to, contraceptives.
Id. at 681-82. The Court referred to its prior decisions establishing "that the Consti-
tution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intru-
sion by the State." Id. at 687. The Court stated that while there is no fundamental
right of access to contraceptives per se, such a right is derived from the "constitution-
ally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing." Id. at 688. Similarly,
there is no need to establish a fundamental right to commit suicide, but rather, the
right may be derived from the constitutionally protected right of privacy, which
should protect a hunger striker against the governmental intrusion of force-feeding.
1983]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
should have determined whether the government had the right to
intrude upon the bodily integrity of the prisoner. Although the gov-
ernment may have an interest in preventing suicide,36 it must not
pursue its interest in a manner repugnant to the Constitution.
Because bodily integrity is a fundamental right, 37 the government
should not be permitted to force-feed unless it shows that hunger
striking threatens a compelling governmental interest. 38
II. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
The government has general legitimate interests in promoting the
health, safety and welfare of society. 39 Although the definition of
"compelling" is not derived from precise "mathematical formulas, ' 40
certain of these interests have been recognized as compelling, 41 and
have been or could be asserted to justify force-feeding. 42 For the
purposes of this Note, compelling interests are categorized as either
general societal-those that apply to all members of society-or pe-
nal-those that are peculiar to the prison environment. 43 When a
36. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
741-42, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (1977); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 68,
450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625-26 (1982); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 57
(W. Va. 1982). See infra pt. II(A)(1).
37. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
39. The states may act to promote this interest under their police powers. Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). On the federal level, the commerce
clause, although intended primarily to regulate economic interests, has also been
used for the "protection of safety, order and morals." E. Freund, The Police Power-
Public Policy and Constitutional Rights § 66, at 64 (1904). The commerce clause has
been interpreted as creating a national police power. See United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); B.
Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 4.10, at 118 (2d ed. 1979).
40. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); see J. Nowak, supra note
21, at 383 ("Under the strict scrutiny standard the Court requires that the law be
necessary to promote a compelling ... interest .... [T]he justices [must be] satis-
fied that the law is necessary to promote an end of government which is clearly more
important than the limitation of the fundamental liberty .... ").
41. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1977).
42. Boyce v. Petrovsky, No. 81-3322, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981)
(governmental duty to protect and care for those within its custody); Von Holden v.
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 68, 70-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625, 627 (1982) (governmen-
tal interest in preventing suicide and in maintaining prison discipline); State ex rel.
White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 57 (W. Va. 1982) (governmental interest in prevent-
ing suicide and in enhancing the sanctity of life).
43. In Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982), in
determining whether force-feeding should be permitted, the court discussed a general
societal interest, the prevention of suicide, id. at 68-69, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26, and
a penal interest, the maintenance of order and discipline. Id. at 70-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 627. See supra note 21.
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general societal interest is asserted, as opposed to a penal interest, the
government bears a heavier burden of proof in justifying the infringe-
ment of a fundamental right.44 The standard of proof is not deter-
mined by the inmate's status, but by the interest asserted. For exam-
ple, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,45 a state statute authorizing sterilization
of certain recidivist prisoners 46 was held unconstitutional.4 7 Because
the state interest asserted-reduction of the criminal gene poo14-is a
general societal interest, the government was subject to the higher
standard of proof. 49 Conversely, when a penal interest is asserted,
substantial deference has been afforded the opinions of prison officials
regarding the need to encroach upon a fundamental right. 50 Thus, it is
important to characterize a governmental interest asserted to justify
force-feeding as either general societal or penal.
A. General Societal Interests
1. The Prevention of Suicide
In Von Holden v. Chapman,51 a New York appellate court permit-
ted force-feeding, relying on the government's interest in preventing
suicide.52 The court, however, did not determine whether the govern-
ment was protecting solely the individual from his own actions,5 3 or
44. Compare Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 127
n.5, 128 (1977) (penal interest) (prison officials did not have to offer "one scintilla of
evidence" to support their belief that the union would disrupt operation of the
prison) with Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63, 268 (1974)
(general societal interest) (state must satisfy "heavy burden of justification" as to
manner in which a burden on fundamental right of travel furthers the state's interest
in preventing fraud).
45. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
46. Id. at 536-37.
47. Id. at 541.
48. Id. at 541-42.
49. See id. at 541. Because this classification affected the fundamental right of
procreation, the Court examined the state statute under the strict scrutiny standard.
Id. This standard requires the state to establish a compelling interest. J. Nowak,
supra note 21, at 383.
50. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 555 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128-29, 133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 827 (1974). See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
51. 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
52. Id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26. Similarly, in State ex rel. White v. Narick,
292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982), the court relied on the governmental interest in
preserving life, which it considered to be the converse of the prevention of suicide.
Id. at 57.
53. See 87 A.D.2d at 68-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-27. For discussions on the
permissibility of protecting an individual from his own actions, see Ravin v. State,
1983] 753
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whether it was also seeking to protect the public as a whole. 54 A
governmental interest based only on the protection of an individual
from his own acts should not be considered legitimate. As John Stuart
Mill wrote in 1863:55
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. 56
Adherence to Mill's philosophy is essential to the protection of individ-
ual rights. Otherwise, the power of the majority would be unlim-
ited,57 and could be exerted over all aspects of a person's life." A basic
tenet of our democratic government is that the majority may not
indiscriminately impose its views on the minority.5 9
This reasoning is reflected in Stanley v. Georgia,60 in which the
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a state law that
criminalized the mere possession of obscene material.' The Court
stated that while the government may regulate the public dissemina-
537 P.2d 494, 508-09 (Alaska 1975); State v. Cotton, 55 Hawaii 138, 139, 516 P.2d
709, 710 (1973); E. Freund, supra note 39, § 155, at 141-42.
54. See 87 A.D.2d at 68-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-27.
55. J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1863).
56. Id. at 23.
57. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Norton, Judge
Bazelon held that homosexual conduct by a tenured civil servant is an insufficient
ground for dismissal. Id. at 1168. Judge Bazelon reasoned that "the notion that it
could be an appropriate function of the federal bureaucracy to enforce the majority's
conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of its employees is at war with
elementary concepts of liberty, privacy, and diversity." Id. at 1165; see Lister, The
Right to Control the Use of One's Body, in The Rights of Americans 348-64 (N.
Dorsen ed. 1970).
58. State v. Cotton, 55 Hawaii 138, 147, 516 P.2d 709, 714 (1973) (Abe, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he protection of an individual from himself is [not] within the
legitimate exercise of the police power; otherwise . . . the State could regulate an
individual's life, his way of living, and even his way of thinking.").
59. C. Antieau, Rights of Our Fathers 193-201 (1968). In his chapter on limita-
tions of natural rights, Antieau noted:
Well understood and accepted by the American Founding Fathers was the
rule of the natural law that permits limitation upon the exercise of natural
rights when clearly necessary for the common good ...... Rightful lib-
erty," Thomas Jefferson once noted, "is unobstructed action according to
our will within limits drawn around by the equal rights of others."
Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
61. Id. at 568. The obscene materials was found in the home of the defendant.
Id. at 558. The Court noted that, in addition to first amendment considerations, id.
at 564, the defendant's fundamental "right to be free, except in very limited circum-
[Vol. 51754
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tion of ideas considered harmful to the public,6 2 it may not regulate an
individual's personal thoughts, even though controlling one's moral
thoughts may be to some a "noble purpose." 63 Georgia asserted that its
law protected the public from harm, but the Court rejected the
assertion as unfounded. 64
Although the Court has not addressed the issue of whether restric-
tions may be imposed solely to protect an individual from self-destruc-
tive acts,65 it follows from Stanley that the government should be
required to show a public harm. This proposition has been discussed
in the many cases reviewing state laws that require motorcyclists to
wear helmets. 6 A majority of these courts have determined that such
stances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy" was also af-
fected. Id.
62. Id. at 566.
63. Id. at 565-66.
64. See id. at 566-68. For example, Georgia asserted that "exposure to obscene
materials may lead to. . . crimes of sexual violence." Id. at 566.
65. Certain language in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), arguably supports
the view that the government may protect an individual from his own acts:
The state has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum
safety for the patient. . . . Thus, the State retains a definite interest in
protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed
at a late stage of pregnancy.
Id. at 150. This language, however, should not be interpreted as validating a law
that protects one solely from self-destructive acts when the potential recipient of care
does not want such care. Moreover, when the government seeks to force-feed a
hunger striker, it seeks to regulate not only a procedure, but the actual decision of the
hunger striker as well. Roe should not be interpreted to allow regulation of such a
decision. Cf. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir.) (government
may not force a patient to undergo medical treatment, but if patient decides to
receive treatment, government may monitor it), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
The Supreme Court upheld proscriptions on polygamous marriages even though
such restrictions impinged on the fundamental right to exercise religion. See Mormon
Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 166 (1878). Such a proscription arguably protects an individual from his own
acts. In upholding such restriction, the Reynolds court queried: "[I]f a wife reli-
giously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead
husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her
carrying her belief into practice?" Id. However, the court in In re Brooks, 32 111. 2d
361, 367-68, 205 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1965), stated that such proscriptions were upheld
because polygamy harms the public.
66. See L. Tribe, supra note 20, § 15-12, at 939. For a discussion of cases
addressing motorcycle helmet laws, see id. at 938-39; Note, Motorcycle Helmets and
the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 355 (1969).
Motorcycle cases requiring the assertion of a public harm include Kingery v. Chap-
ple, 504 P.2d 831, 835-36 (Alaska 1972); People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 450, 250
N.E.2d 149, 151 (1969); People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 1029-30, 277 N.Y.S.
2d 429, 432 (1967); State v. Betts, 252 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Franklin, Ohio Mun. Ct.
1969). But see State v. Quinnam, 367 A.2d 1032, 1033 (Me. 1977).
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laws protect the public; 7 the laws did not rest entirely on the protec-
tion of the motorcyclist. 6 In State v. Cotton,69 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii ruled that to be valid, Hawaii's motorcycle law must further
public protection: "We accept . . . the fundamental tenet that the
relationship between the individual and the state leaves no room for
regulations which have as their purpose and effect solely the protec-
tion of the individual from his own folly." 70
Consistent with the premise that protection of an individual from
his own acts is not a valid purpose, the government may not force-feed
a hunger striker solely to prevent a suicide.7' The beliefs that "suicide
67. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 508-09 (Alaska 1975); see, e.g., Simon v.
Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass.) (per curiam) (public protection is preven-
tion of societal costs resulting when motorcyclist is injured), aff'd mem., 409 U.S.
1020 (1972); Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (protection
of other motorists sufficient to uphold law), appeal dismissed per curiam, 441 F.2d
623 (5th Cir. 1971); People v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 320, 247 N.W.2d 798, 800
(1976) (same); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 355, 247 A.2d 176, 177-78
(Hudson County Ct. 1969) (same); Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 50-51, 165
N.W.2d 377, 381-82 (same), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 709 (1969). But see People v.
Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 1029-30, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1967) (no public
protection, law unconstitutional); State v. Betts, 252 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Franklin,
Ohio Mun. Ct. 1969) (same).
68. But see State v. Quinnam, 367 A.2d 1032, 1033 (Me. 1977).
69. 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709 (1973).
70. Id. at 139, 516 P.2d at 710. The court upheld the Hawaiian motorcycle law
because it protected the state from costs incident to motorcycle accidents and main-
tained social order. Id. at 141, 516 P.2d at 711.
The protection of an individual from his own acts has been held insufficient in
other situations. In In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972), the court refused to
order a patient to submit to a blood transfusion. Id. at 375. The court reasoned that
"[t]he notion that the individual exists for the good of the state is, of course, quite
antithetical to our fundamental thesis that the role of the state is to ensure a maxi-
mum of individual freedom of choice and conduct." Id. at 375 n.5. In Ravin v. State,
537 P.2d 494, 507 (Alaska 1975), the court ruled that the prohibition against the
possession of marijuana at home violated Alaska's constitution. The court, accepting
the proposition that the state could exercise its power only over activities affecting
others, found no harm to the public. Id. at 504. Contra Marcoux v. Attorney
General, 375 Mass. 63, 70, 375 N.E.2d 688, 692 (1978) (law criminalizing possession
of marijuana upheld because state may protect individuals from "their own folly").
In Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1010, 1015-18 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964),
Judge Burger voted to dismiss the petition concerning forced administration of a
blood transfusion to an unwilling recipient for lack of justiciable controversy, stating
that some matters are "beyond reach of all governmental power." Id. at 1016.
71. A minority of states currently classify attempted suicide as a crime. Model
Penal Code § 210.5 comment 2 (1980); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on
Criminal Law § 74, at 569 (1972).
The issue whether attempted suicide is a crime does not determine the compel-
ling nature of a governmental interest. The government under its police powers, may
prevent certain acts, whether or not the act is a crime. Cf. Cantor, supra note 27, at
255 (issue whether "attempted suicide is a criminal offense [is] not determinative of
whether a state can validly compel a reluctant patient to undergo treatment"). But
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[is] against the law of God" and that suicide is morally wrong 72 are
not based on legal principles. There are, however, purposes beyond
the protection of the hunger striker related to the prevention of suicide
that may justify force-feeding. 73
2. The Protection of Incompetents
Although the government generally may not protect an individual
from his own acts, it may protect certain classes of individuals.7 4 The
government has a compelling interest in protecting incompetents be-
cause they cannot protect themselves. 75 Because the government may
cf. Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 48, 68 (1954)
("[I]n those states where attempted suicide has been made lawful by statute (or the
lack of one), the refusal of necessary medical aid, whether equal to or less than
attempted suicide, must be conceded to be lawful.").
72. Van Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 69, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1982)
(citing Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953)).
73. The government has a compelling interest in preventing its citizens from
becoming public charges. See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Com-
petent Adult, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 33-36 (1975). If force-feeding would in fact
protect the government from having to support dependents of the hunger striker,
force-feeding may be justified. Cf. Application of President & Directors of George-
town College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.) (blood transfusion ordered over
refusal of patient to consent, one consideration being that "[t]he patient had a
responsibility to the community to care for her infant"), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972) (blood transfusion not ordered
because patient had already provided for family). This justification, however, has
not been raised in the cases addressing the permissibility of force-feeding.
Medical ethics considerations have been asserted as a compelling governmental
interest when a terminally ill patient refused treatment. Superintendent of Belcher-
town State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977).
This interest, however, appears not to be compelling. The protection of a doctor's
conscience to save a dying patient is not a compelling interest: "The law of informed
consent would be rendered meaningless if patient choice were subservient to consci-
entious medical judgment. . . . The rule of the supremacy of the 'doctor's conscience'
finds no real support in law." Byrn, supra, at 29 (footnotes omitted); accord Matter
of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Cantor, supra note 27, at 250-51. But see United States
v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) (doctor's conscience must be
considered when patient who voluntarily submitted to medical care demands medi-
cal mistreatment). A doctor's fear of civil or criminal liability is not a compelling
interest. A doctor may protect himself by obtaining a patients' informed consent.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 744 n.12,
370 N.E.2d 417, 427 n.12 (1977); Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d
64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
74. E. Freund, supra note 39, at 142 ("[I]nterest of a class may constitute a
public interest, that is to say, an interest of sufficient magnitude to make itself felt
throughout the community.").
75. See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Ross, Commitment
of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 945, 956-57
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protect incompetents from the harmful effects of their irrational deci-
sions, 76 it has a compelling interest in determining the competency of
a hunger striker, 77 and should have the right to request a hearing for
that purpose.78 If a prisoner is adjudicated incompetent, he may be
force-fed, but if he is adjudicated competent, the government should
yield to his rational decision.79
(1959). The states, under the doctrine of parens patriae have the power to care for
those who, because of mental illness (or minority), cannot care for themselves. See E.
Freund, supra note 39, at 242-43. This doctrine stems from the police powers. See
supra note 39.
76. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977); Cantor, supra note 27, at 256; G. Grisez
& J. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice 127 (1979).
77. The government may assert that it has the right to force-feed an inmate who
decides to hunger strike because the prison environment has depressed him. The
government, however, should only be allowed to force-feed if the hunger striker is
incompetent: "[I]f the patient understands the nature, purpose, and consequences of
the proposed treatment ... he or she is competent. The test is similar to a person's
ability to contract." D. Meyers, Medico-Legal Implications of Death and Dying
§ 15.1, at 470 (1981); see Byrn, supra note 73, at 24.
78. Although the specific type of hearing that should be required is beyond the
scope of this Note, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) offers some guidance. In
Vitek, an inmate was transferred from a state prison to a mental hospital without a
hearing. Id. at 484. A Nebraska statute allowed such a transfer if a psychiatrist
informed the prison director that the inmate suffered from a "mental illness or
defect." Id. The Court held that due process entitled the inmate to a hearing as to his
mental condition before such a transfer could be effected. Id. at 493-94. Because the
inmate's conviction did not also entitle the state "to determine that [the inmate] has a
mental illness," id. at 493, these procedural safeguards were necessary to prevent
"unwelcome treatment," id. at 495, and the resultant deprivation of the inmate's
liberty interest. Id. at 489-90. The Court held that the interest stemmed from the
specific Nebraska statute. Id. at 487-88.
Similarly, a hunger striker has a liberty interest in bodily integrity; this interest
stems from the Constitution. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text. Because a
unilateral determination of incompetency resulting in force-feeding involves "unwel-
come treatment" and the deprivation of a liberty interest, a hunger striker should be
afforded a hearing as to his competency. As in Vitek, however, the hearing need not
be in a traditional adversarial setting to avoid unnecessary disruption of prison
administration. Id. at 496. The Court, in adopting the district court's procedures,
required the government to provide written notice, a hearing, an opportunity for the
inmate to present evidence in his favor "except upon a finding ... of good cause for
not permitting such presentation." Id. at 494-96. Additionally, an independent
decision-maker (who may come from inside the prison) must be provided, and a
decision must be written by the factfinder. Id. at 495-96. Also, the inmate is entitled
to "independent assistance" at the hearing, id. at 497, but the state is not required to
provide counsel. See id.; id. at 497-500 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
79. The argument that a decision to hunger strike and eventually die cannot be
rational is incorrect. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312-13 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, Circuit Justice); Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, in Hand-
book for the Study of Suicide 61, 72 (S. Perlin ed. 1975). As Justice Rehnquist stated:
The idea that the deliberate decision of one under sentence of death to
abandon possible additional legal avenues of attack on that sentence cannot
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3. Preservation of Society
The preservation of society is another purpose that the government
may assert to justify force-feeding. s0 If hunger striking creates a suffi-
cient role-model effect on others, this interest would be threatened.
Sociological studies on the modeling or imitative effect of suicide have
produced conflicting results."' One noted sociologist, Emile
Durkheim, posited that imitation is rarely the reason one commits
suicide. 2 He found that only persons having a strong predisposition to
suicide are likely to imitate, and that such persons would probably
have committed suicide anyway. 3 Because the government bears a
heavy burden in justifying an infringement of a fundamental right
based upon a general societal interest,8 4 neither the mere possibility of
modeling nor the existence of conflicting evidence that modeling will
occur justifies force-feeding.8 5
be a rational decision, regardless of its motive, suggests that the preservation
of one's own life at whatever cost is the summum bonum, a proposition with
respect to which the greatest philosophers and theologians have not agreed
and with respect to which the United States Constitution by its terms does
not speak.
443 U.S. at 1312-13 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
80. Cantor, supra note 27, at 242; see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412
(1974); G. Grisez & J. Boyle, supra note 76, at 125-26; cf. Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (government has power to prevent revolution that would
lead to anarchy).
81. Compare D. Lester, Why People Kill Themselves 187-89 (1972) (cannot
draw reliable conclusion from evidence on imitative effect of suicide) with D. deCa-
tanzaro, Suicide and Self-Damaging Behavior-A Sociobiological Perspective 77-81
(1981) (increasing evidence that suicide has imitative effect).
82. E. Durkheim, Suicide-A Study in Sociology 123-42 (1963). Although there
has been evidence of modeling of hunger striking in prisons, Von Holden v. Chap-
man, 87 A.D.2d 66, 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (1982), the hunger striking was
apparently not for the purpose of committing suicide, see State ex rel. White v.
Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1982), and therefore did not threaten preservation
of society. Rather, "[t]heir main aim [was] to gain attention from prison officials and
occasionally from the public, to manipulate the system." Id. at 58; see Commissioner
of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 267, 399 N.E.2d 452, 459 (1979) (prison
official's assertion that an inmate's right to refuse life-saving treatment will be
misused by inmates to have demands met). Hunger striking for the purpose of forcing
prison officials to accede to demands will not be encouraged if the officials do not
yield to their demands. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
83. E. Durkheim, supra note 82, at 141-42. Durkheim concluded:
With very rare exceptions, then, it may be said that imitation is not an
original factor of suicide. It only exposes a state which is the true generating
cause of the act and which probably would have produced its natural effect
even had imitation not intervened; for the predisposition must be very
strong to enable so slight a matter to translate it into action.
Id. at 141.
84. See supra notes 20-22, 39-50 and accompanying text.
85. Cf. Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188-91 (1972)("ambivalent responses" to
queries regarding student violence not sufficient to overcome right to freedom of
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4. The Enhancement of the Sanctity of Life
Another purpose that may be asserted is the government's interest in
promoting the sanctity of life.86 Because unnecessary death arguably
cheapens the value of life,8 7 perhaps the government should be per-
mitted to force-feed a hunger striker. Although this argument has
initial appeal, it does not consider whether the sanctity of life could be
enhanced by allowing a hunger striker to die. As one commentator
noted, "[h]uman dignity is enhanced by permitting the individual to
determine for himself what beliefs are worth dying for."88
Many courts have recognized the right of a terminally ill patient to
refuse life-prolonging medical treatment.8 9 Although some consider-
ations in those cases differ from those involving hunger strikers,90 both
situations involve the concept of choice and the impact of unnecessary
death on the value of life. For example, in Superintendent of Belcher-
town State School v. Saikewicz,9' the Supreme Judicial Court of
expression). In Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F.
Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), the court ruled that the defendant university's
refusal to recognize a gay rights group was unconstitutional. id. at 1274. In defense
of its position, the university asserted that recognizing the group would increase
homosexual activity. id. at 1273. The court in reply stated that "[i]n the face of such
contrasting opinions, defendants have not carried the 'heavy burden' [of establishing
an infringement to a compelling state interest]." Id. at 1274.
86. Cantor, supra note 27, at 244 ("Sanctity of life is not just a vague theological
precept. It is the foundation of a free society."). Society becomes brutalized as the
value of life declines.
Arguably, the state may also have an interest in "promoting a thriving and
productive population." Id. at 242. Such an interest, however, would not outweigh
the right to privacy because the resulting "marginal social utility" palls in light of the
"immediate invasion" of personal privacy "both because of the small numbers in-
volved and the attenuated impact on the economy." Id. at 243.
87. See State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 57 (W. Va. 1982) (There are
"compelling reasons for preserving life, not the least being civility."); cf. Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 (1977) ("[T]he State has an additional interest in seeing to it that individual
decisions on the prolongation of life [by medical treatment] do not in any way tend to
'cheapen' the value which is placed in the concept of living.").
88. Cantor, supra note 27, at 244; accord Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
89. E.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374-75 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965); Lane v. Candura, 6
Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (1978); Superintendent of Belcher-
town State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-25,
427 (1977); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 289-90, 383 A.2d 785, 789-90
(P. Ct. 1978); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, 272, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
90. According to commentators, the terminally ill patient does not have the
specific intent to die and has not set in motion the life-ending mechanism. Byrn,
supra note 73, at 17-19; Bratton, The Right to Die: A Constitutional One?, 41 Jurist
155, 165 n. 56 (1981).
91. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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Massachusetts, while recognizing the right of a guardian to refuse
chemotherapy for a 67-year-old incompetent, 92 acknowledged the in-
terest of the state in assuring that the decision did not cheapen the
value of life.9 3 The court concluded, however:
The constitutional right to privacy . . . is an expression of the
sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as funda-
mental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is
lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to
allow a competent human being the right of choice.94
The Supreme Court recognized that the possibility of an unneces-
sary death does not automatically undermine the governmental inter-
est in promoting the sanctity of life when it held that a prisoner on
death row could waive a next-friend appeal.9 5 The concept of choice
prevailed even though an appeal could have resulted in a reversal of
the death sentence.96 The prisoner should not have been granted this
right if unnecessary death automatically degrades the sanctity of life.9 7
Similarly, force-feeding should not be justified on the ground that it
promotes the sanctity of life. Human dignity is enhanced by respect-
ing a prisoner's decision.
92. Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
93. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
94. Id. This principle is exemplified in Brian Clark's play, Whose Life Is It
Anyway?, which has received widespread attention and was produced as a major
motion picture:
Judge: But wouldn't you agree that many people with appalling physical
handicaps have overcome them and lived essentially creative, dignified
lives?
Ken: Yes, I would, but the dignity starts with their choice. If I choose to
live, it would be appalling if society killed me. If I choose to die, it is equally
appalling if society keeps me alive.
Judge: I cannot accept that it is undignified for society to devote resources to
keeping someone alive. Surely it enhances that society.
Ken: It is not undignified if the man wants to stay alive, but I must restate
that the dignity starts with his choice. Without it, it is degrading because
technology has taken over from human will.
B. Clark, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, in Best Plays of the Seventies 309 (1980).
95. Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 725 (1980) (per curiam); see Note, The
Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision? 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 575, 576
(1981) (capital defendant cannot waive automatic appeal, but may waive discretion-
ary appeal). To waive a next-friend appeal, the prisoner must be competent. See
Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 725 (1980) (per curiam). See Taylor, When
Weighing a Stay of Execution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at A20, col. 4, for a
discussion of a death-row prisoner who waived such appeal.
96. See Hammet v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 726 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. In Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), in
deciding whether to issue a stay of execution based on a next-friend appeal when the
defendant did not wish to prevent his execution, Justice Rehnquist stated: "From my
view of the controlling legal precepts, the record evidence of competency is more
1983]
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5. Protection and Care of Those Within the
Custody of the Government
The government has a duty to protect and care for those within its
custody. 98 This duty includes providing for the medical and dietary
needs of prisoners. 99 Failure to meet minimum standards violates the
eighth amendment. 00 In Boyce v. Petrovsky,101 a federal district court
permitted force-feeding, reasoning that the government could not be
relieved of this duty. 10 2
On the other hand, in Zant v. Prevatte,10 3 the Supreme Court of
Georgia ruled that this duty does not give the government "the right
to feed [a prisoner] to prevent his death from starvation if that is his
wish." 104 The government's duty is to provide care for prisoners, not
to impose it on unwilling recipients.10 5 Moreover, even the Boyce
court recognized that this duty emanates from the government's inter-
est in "dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency." 1 06 These
concepts are implicit in the governmental interests of preserving soci-
ety and promoting the sanctity of life.107 As previously discussed,
important to the determination of whether a stay is appropriate than is the merit of
the underlying application." Id. at 1310 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). Nevertheless,
Justice Rehnquist issued the stay of Jesse Bishop's execution because the full Court
was going to consider the application a short time thereafter. Id. at 1313 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice). At that later date, the stay was denied and the inmate executed.
Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807 (1979).
98. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d
1115, 1149, modified in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 519 (N.D. Ind.
1981).
99. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 683 (1978); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 834 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing); J. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners § 10.3 (2d ed. 1977).
100. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976). Failure to meet a "contempo-
rary standard of decency" in providing "basic human needs" violates the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-87 (1977);
Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (2d Cir. 1974); Williams v. Vincent,
508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974).
101. No. 81-3322 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981).
102. Id. slip op. at 2 ("[T]he government cannot be relieved of that constitutional
obligation by the unreliable whims of individual prisoners." (emphasis added)). If
the prisoner is deemed competent, however, his decision to refuse care is not unrelia-
ble. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
103. 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982).
104. Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
105. Similarly, although the states have the duty to appoint counsel in certain
instances, it does not have the right to impose representation on competent defend-
ants wishing to represent themselves if such defendants clearly and willingly waive
their right to counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833 (1975).
106. Boyce v. Petrovsky, No. 81-3322, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981)
(quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
107. See supra pt. II(A)(3-4) and accompanying text.
1983] HUNGER STRIKING PRISONERS 763
however, these interests, although compelling, are not threatened by
hunger strikes. 0 8 If the interests underlying a duty are not threatened,
the duty should not be a basis for force-feeding.10 9 The duty should
not be used as a sword to intrude upon a prisoner's privacy, but rather
as a shield, to be used by an inmate seeking the protection of a
minimum level of care.
It is submitted that the decisions that have permitted force-feeding
based on the assertion of general societal interests" are erroneous.
Assuming a prisoner is competent, no general societal interest can
justify the bodily intrusion of force-feeding. This result may be differ-
ent, however, when a penal interest is asserted by the government.
B. Penal Interests
The Supreme Court has stated that the maintenance of prison
discipline and security is the most important penal interest."' Hunger
108. Id.
109. Fear of liability based on the government's duty should not justify force-
feeding. In Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982), the
court noted that the state "may be cast in civil damages for its failure to observe such
duty." Id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. Although the government has the duty to
supervise suicidal persons within its custody, Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, 7-8,
439 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553 (1981); see Suicide Prevention Program, 28 C.F.R. § 549.70-
.71 (1982), this duty is designed to prevent an irrational act. See supra note 76. If an
inmate was competent at the time of the decision to hunger strike, the failure to
prevent such an act is not blameworthy. See W. Prosser, Handbook on Torts § 18, at
101 (4th ed. 1971) (no wrong done to willing person).
110. Boyce v. Petrovsky, No. 81-3322, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981)
(government's duty to care for prisoners outweighs prisoner's privacy right); Von
Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 68-70, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625-26 (1982) (govern-
ment's interest in preventing suicide outweighs prisoner's privacy right); State ex rel.
White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1982) (government's interest in preserv-
ing life outweighs prisoner's privacy right).
111. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
823 (1974). In Pell, the Court stated that "the legitmate penological objectives of the
corrections system" also include general deterrence, specific deterrence and rehabili-
tation. Id. at 822-23. The Court stated that "[i]t is in the light of these legitimate
penal objectives that a court must assess challenges to prison regulations based on
asserted constitutional rights of prisoners." Id. at 823. With the possible exception of
threatening prison discipline and security, see infra notes 112-19 and accompanying
text, hunger striking should not threaten these interests.
The death of a hunger striker should not threaten the objective of general deter-
rence, that is, the deterrence of others from committing crimes. Id. at 822. Because
death "can scarcely be said to be an easier or preferable alternative," Zellick, The
Forcible Feeding of Prisoners: An Examination of the Legality of Enforced Therapy,
1976 Pub. L. 153, 175, the knowledge that one may hunger strike in prison without
interruption should not hinder the deterrent effect the fear of incarceration has on
potential offenders. Specific deterrence is not impinged because the hunger striker
who dies is removed permanently from society. Rehabilitation has been considered
an important penal objective "since most offenders will eventually return to society."
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strikers may threaten this interest in different ways. For instance, if
the hunger striker makes demands to which prison authorities accede,
other prisoners may be encouraged to hunger strike, thus creating
havoc in the administration of the prison. 112 If prison officials demon-
strate tenacity in not acceding to the demands, however, the hunger
striker, as well as the other inmates, are likely to realize that hunger
strikes are not an effective manipulative tool.1 3 Prisoners may instead
voice their complaints through administrative and judicial avenues. 14
Hunger strikers may carry out their threats to die, however, if
prison officials do not accede to demands. Prison officials might be
subjected to pressure from other prisoners, prison staff, family mem-
bers and the general public to prevent the deaths., 5 But pressure
alone should not justify constitutional violations. For example, public
officials have been required to implement desegregation programs
despite the pressure of communities vehemently opposed to desegrega-
tion." 6 The avoidance of public pressure is not a compelling inter-
417 U.S. at 823. If the hunger striker dies, however, rehabilitation would not be
applicable. See Zellick, supra, at 175.
112. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 264, 399 N.E.2d 452,
457 (1979); see State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1982).
113. Zellick, supra note 111, at 175.
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Prisoners are entitled to seek
redress of wrongs through judicial or administrative procedures. J. Palmer, supra
note 99, ch. 11 (2d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1981); Breed & Dillingham, Dispute Resolution
in Corrections, in Prisoners' Rights Sourcebook 139, 139 (I. Robbins ed. 1980);
Project, Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1981-82, 71 Geo. L.J. 339, 779-800 (1982). For exam-
ple, a federal prisoner may apply for an administrative remedy to "review . . . any
aspect of his imprisonment if less formal procedures have not resolved the matter." 28
C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.15 (1982). An inmate may also have his claim reviewed in state or
federal court if the jurisdictional prerequisites are met. J. Palmer, supra note 99, §
11.2-.3.
A state prisoner may bring a suit against prison officials for violating his rights
under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Cooper v.
Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam) (state inmates have right to sue their
keepers under § 1983); see J. Palmer, supra note 99, § 11.6. A federal prisoner may
sue prison officials for damages resulting from constitutional violations. Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16-25 (1980); see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
115. As one official faced with pressure to prevent such a death said: "[I]t would
be very difficult to make the prisoners, their families and the correction department
staff understand that I had done everything legally possible to prevent a death of a
prisoner .... . Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 267, 399
N.E.2d 452, 459 (1979).
116. For example, in 1962, James Meredith, a black student, was granted permis-
sion under a Fifth Circuit order to enroll at the University of Mississippi. See
Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1962). Governor Ross Barnett strongly
opposed the desegregation and refused to enforce the court's order. S. Wasby, A.
D'Amato & R. Metrailer, Desegregation from Brown to Alexander 211 (1977). Fed-
eral marshalls, facing violent opposition, escorted Meredith onto the campus. Id; see
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est," 7 and should not justify force-feeding." 8 The death of a hunger
striker, however, may spark a prison riot." 9 If the government estab-
lishes that such a threat to prison discipline and security exists, it
would be justified in force-feeding the prisoner. 20
The government's burden in proving the infringement of a penal
interest is significantly lighter than its heavy burden in proving the
infringement of a general societal interest.' 2' Substantial deference is
afforded the opinion of prison officials. 122 For example, in Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,12 3 the Court deferred to the
prison official's opinion that the exercise of a prisoner's first amend-
ment rights would disrupt prison discipline. 24 The Court reasoned
that requiring a higher showing would unnecessarily burden the oper-
also H. Rodgers & C. Bullock, Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their
Consequences 71-74 (1972) (elected officials publicly announced their refusal to
implement desegregation plans); cf. A. Goldberg, Equal Justice: The Warren Era of
the Supreme Court 60 (1971) ("[T]here is no justification for the Court to avoid
deciding a citizen's substantial claim of constitutional right on the basis that it may
injure itself it if decides that case and vindicates those rights.").
117. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) ("[T]he regulation or
practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor inmate
correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions .... ").
118. One commentator, in discussing whether the British government should yield
to public pressure to force-feed Irish hunger strikers, stated that the "desire to avoid
political embarrassment" is not a compelling ground. Zellick, supra note 111, at 173-
74.
119. A prison riot has devastating effects both for the government and the prison
population. See R. Oswald, Attica-My Story 254-98 (1972); T. Wicker, A Time to
Die 269-310 (1975); New York State Special Commission on Attica, Attica-The
Official Report 366-470 (1972).
120. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison officials must be free to
take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel and
to prevent escape or unauthorized entry."); accord Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977); see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 369, 412-14 (1974).
121. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
123. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
124. Id. at 128-29, 132. The prisoners were prohibited from participating in union
activities. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. The deference permitted
under Jones has been criticized as entirely removing prisoners' first amendment
rights. See Calhoun, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:
A Reappraisal, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 219, 220, 234 (1977); Comment, The Future
of Prisoners' Unions: Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 13 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 799, 803-04 (1978).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall noted that a rule permitting such
deference deviates from previous Supreme Court cases concerning prisoners' rights.
See 433 U.S. at 143 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For example, even though segregation
in certain prisons may be rationally related to the prevention of prison disorder, the
Court ruled in Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), that segregated prisons are
unconstitutional. 433 U.S. at 143 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ation of prisons, 2 5 such operation being within the particular knowl-
edge and expertise of the prison authorities.1 2 6
The substantial deference afforded the opinion of the prison official
in Jones, however, should not always be granted. The degree of
deference should vary according to the magnitude of the intrusion
upon the inmate's constitutional rights. Although certain intrusions
may be permitted based solely on the opinion of a prison official, more
substantial intrusions should be allowed only upon a showing of a
factual basis to support the assertion. This distinction is based on the
consequences that would ensue if the prison official's opinion is
wrong. For example, if one avenue of speech is removed as a result of
an erroneous assertion,12 7 the right to freedom of speech may still be
exercised by other means.' 28 Substantial deference is properly afforded
here. A force-feeding, however, involves an "all or nothing" intrusion.
If the official is wrong in asserting the need to force-feed, the right to
bodily integrity would be substantially and unnecessarily violated. A
prison official should therefore be required to support his opinion that
force-feeding is necessary.' 29
While a requirement of proof of an actual disruption would com-
promise the important governmental interest of maintaining prison
discipline and security, 30 affording absolute deference to the opinion
of a prison official would not adequately protect the inmate's right of
privacy. '3 Thus, the proper standard should give appropriate defer-
ence to the prison official's opinion while ensuring that a threat to
prison discipline and security actually exists.
125. See 433 U.S. at 128.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
129. The magnitude of such an intrusion is not justified by an unsupported asser-
tion by a prison official. In Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399
N.E.2d 452 (1979), however, the court permitted a forced hemodialysis, id. at 265-
66, 399 N.E.2d at 458, without requiring the warden to support his opinion that "one
could expect an explosive reaction by other inmates to the death." Id. at 267, 399
N.E.2d at 459 app. If the warden was wrong, the inmate unnecessarily suffered a
grave intrusion upon his right of privacy.
130. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977)
("Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we
have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of
prison administrators.").
131. See id. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[P]rison officials inevitably will err
on the side of too little freedom."); cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58
(1965) (a censor will not be as protective of the first amendment as would a court).
Prison officials have incentive to stop a hunger strike because a prisoner's death may
subject the official to adverse public pressure, whereas an invasion of the prisoner's
privacy generally would not. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Thus, a
court is best situated to protect the interests of both the prisoner and prison officials.
433 U.S. at 141-43.
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Because the fourth amendment balances the invasion of personal
rights against governmental security interests,1 32 the standards devel-
oped by the Supreme Court regarding the reasonableness of searches
and seizures are useful in deriving a standard under which force-
feeding would be justified. A major factor in determining the reason-
ableness of a search and seizure is the intrusiveness of the invasion.133
As the invasion of privacy increases, the level of requisite suspicion
increases.13 4 A full search, for example, imposes a great intrusion and
therefore requires the highest showing-probable cause.135 A standard
as stringent as probable cause, however, should not be used when a
penal interest is asserted, considering the peculiarities of the prison
environment. 136 Although force-feeding is at least as intrusive as a full
132. Under the fourth amendment, the reasonableness of a search depends "on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference." United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975)); see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 & n.4 (1981); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-58 & n.12 (1976); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949); W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions
§§ 1.1-.3, 4.1 (1980).
133. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 537 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); W. Ringel, supra note
132, § 2.2.
134. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545, 566-67 (1976)
(routine stopping of vehicles for brief questioning at permanent checkpoint near
border is permissible absent individualized suspicion, considering limited intrusion);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) ("Because of the limited
nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort [stopping and questioning occupants of an
automobile] may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause
required for an arrest.").
135. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968); United States v. Nembhard, 676
F.2d 193, 202 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3984 (U.S. June 3, 1982) (No. 81-2239).
In Terry, a frisk incident to police questioning, which the Court said "must be
limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons ... and may realisti-
cally be characterized as something less than a 'full' search," 392 U.S. at 26, was held
permissible absent probable cause because the intrusion on the suspect's privacy right
is not too great. Id. Additionally, the governmental interest in protecting police from
the use of weapons justified the lesser standard. Id. at 26-27.
The Supreme Court has stated that probable cause requires "more than bare
suspicion: Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
The Supreme Court has required probable cause for automobile searches because
such searches are a "substantial invasion of privacy." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 896 (1975); accord Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
136. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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search, applying such a standard would violate the admonition in
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union 137 that prison officials
must not be required to "compile a dossier on the eve of a riot."'13
Rather, a standard similar to the one required in certain less intrusive
invasions, such as in "stop and inquiry" cases, 139 should be applied.
This standard, "reasonable suspicion,"'140 requires the government to
show "articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts," reasonably support its suspicion. 141 A prison official
would thus be required to provide facts from which a court may
determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that force-
feeding is necessary to prevent a riot.142
For example, observations of the prison staff including the prison
official, statements by inmates, and any petitions or letters circulating
among the prisoners should be considered. Additionally, as the Su-
preme Court stated, a prisoner's purpose in exercising a right is a
relevant factor "in determining whether [such an exercise] is likely to
be a disruptive influence." 143 It may be that a prisoner who is hunger
striking for solely personal reasons is less likely to cause disruption
than one who is hunger striking for the purpose of making demands,
particularly when the latter has the support of fellow inmates. A court
should take these factors into account, together with the experience of
the prison official making the assertion, 144 in determining whether
137. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
138. Id. at 133.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968);
United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3984 (U.S. June 3, 1982) (No. 81-2239).
140. United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1981); see Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Babula v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 665 F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1981); United States
v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1731 (1982).
141. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); accord United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
142. Cf. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979) (unconstitutional to stop
defendant because police officer "was unable to point to any facts" to support his
"suspicion" of criminal activity); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-
86 (1975) (mere fact occupants of car were of Mexican descent did not create a
reasonable suspicion for border patrol to stop car); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1968) (frisk incident to questioning was constitutional as "facts and circumstances"
warranted officer's fear for his safety).
143. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 n.4
(1977).
144. Prison security is "peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of
corrections officials." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); accord Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974); cf.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979)(observations of trained police officer
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there is a reasonable basis to believe that prison discipline and security
is threatened.
Although the Supreme Court has not formally adopted the reason-
able basis standard, it seems to have implicitly endorsed it in Bell v.
Wolfih. 4 5 In Bell, the Court upheld both a prison rule that prohib-
ited inmates from receiving hard-cover books not mailed directly from
publishers, book clubs or book stores, 146 and a prison practice of
conducting body cavity searches after every contact visit. 147 In permit-
ting the restriction of first amendment rights, the Court was influ-
enced by the "other avenues" available to the prisoners in obtaining
the materials. 14 The prison officials were not required to support
their assertion that hard-cover books are a great threat to security. 149
Regarding the body cavity searches, however, the Court began its
analysis by noting that "this practice instinctively gives us the most
pause." 1 0 In upholding the prison's practice, the Court did not simply
defer to the opinion of a prison official that the body cavity searches
were necessary to prison security.' 5' Rather, the Court noted that
"inmate attempts to secrete [contraband] into the facility by conceal-
ing them in body cavities are documented in this record ...and in
other cases."' 15
2
should be considered in determining presence of reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (same); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27,
30 (1968) (same).
145. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Although the Court was also concerned with the consti-
tutional rights of pretrial detainees, it did not distinguish between them and con-
victed prisoners. See id. at 546 n.28 ("There is no basis for concluding that pretrial
detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates.").
146. Id. at 548-52.
147. Id. at 558-60.
148. Id. at 552. Inmates had the use of a "relatively large" library, and soft-cover
books could be obtained from any source. Id. Hard-cover books could be received
from certain sources. Id. The possible increased cost in obtaining the materials
elsewhere did not make the restriction unconstitutional. Id.
149. See id. at 550-51. The Court stated that "hardback books are especially
serviceable for smuggling contraband into an institution; money, drugs, and weap-
ons easily may be secreted in the bindings." Id.
150. Id. at 558.
151. See id. at 559.
152. Id. Because the body cavity searches furthered a penal interest, the court did
not require probable cause. See id. at 560. Justice Powell, however, asserted that
body cavity searches should not be allowed as a matter of course. See id. at 563
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In view of the serious intrusion
on one's privacy occasioned by such a search, I think at least some level of cause, such
as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal and genital searches
described ...."); accord Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981) (male
prison official had to show necessity of removing female prisoner's underclothing);
DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (prison officials
required to point to facts concerning the need to examine inmate's diary); Bowling v.
Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (showing required for need to
have female officers inspect male prisoners).
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While the Bell Court admonished the judiciary not to " 'second-
guess' prison administrators,' 53 it also recognized that prisoners'
rights are to be "scrupulously observed."' 154 A "reasonable basis"
standard represents the "mutual accommodation between institu-
tional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution" as
required by the Court in Bell. 155
CONCLUSION
The right of a competent prisoner to be free from the intrusion of
force-feeding is based on the constitutional right of privacy. A pris-
oner may be force-fed only if a governmental interest outweighs the
right to bodily integrity. An analysis of the relevant societal and penal
interests indicates that only prison discipline and security may out-
weigh the inmate's right. Prison officials, however, should be required
to demonstrate a reasonable basis for an assertion that force-feeding is
necessary to prevent prison disruption. Force-feeding would otherwise
be an unconstitutional, albeit well-intentioned, intervention to pre-
vent an inmate from taking his own life.
Joel K. Greenberg
The Bell Court allowed searches of prisoners' rooms based solely on the assertion of
prison officials. See 441 U.S. at 555-57. The Court stated that prisoners have little or
no expectation of privacy regarding their rooms. Id. at 557. Substantial deference
was therefore proper because the intrusion on prisoners was minimal.
153. 441 U.S. at 545 (quoting lower court).
154. Id. at 562.
155. Id. at 546 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). Further-
more, courts must balance the threat to prison discipline and security against the
intrusion of the prisoner's right of privacy. See 441 U.S. at 557 (1979). If a prison
official establishes a reasonable basis that a riot will ensue if a prisoner is not force-
fed, balancing the respective interests will allow force-feeding. If the threat to prison
discipline and security, however, is minimal, such as the fighting of two inmates who
could be controlled easily, a court should consider requiring prison officials to
separate the inmates as an alternative to permitting force-feeding. Cf. Weaver v.
Jago, 675 F.2d 116, 119 (6th Cir. 1982) (lower court should have balanced prison
official's asserted need to restrict hair length against prisoner's right of freedom of
religion, which was encroached by the restriction); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F.
Supp. 1252, 1316-17 (S.D.W. Va. 1981) (female prisoners' right of privacy to be free
from being viewed involuntarily by male prisoners outweighs burden of prison to so
accommodate).
